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2263.  When  Is Growth  Pro-Poor?
Evidence from  Uganda shows that poor  Evidence  from  the Diverse  The data strongly support the hypothesis
publicprovision of infrastructure services  Experiences  of India's  States  that countries with  more unequal distri-
- proxied  by an  unreliable and  inad-  bution of factor income redistribute more
equate power supply - significantly  re-  Martin Ravallion  and Gaurav  Datt  infavorofthepoor-even  when the analy-
duces productive private investment.  (December  1999)  sis controls for older people's share in to-
tal population  (that is, for pension trans-
Lack of private  investment  is a  serious  Nonfarm economic growth  in India  had  fers). But the evidence  on the median voter
policy problem in many developing coun-  very different effects on poverty in differ-  hypothesis is inconclusive even if middle-
tries, especially in Africa. Despite recent  ent states. Nonfarm growth was least ef-  income groups gain  more (or lose less)
structural  reform and  stabilization,  the  fective at reducing poverty in states where  through redistribution in countries where
investment  response  to  date  has  been  initial  conditions were poor in terms  of  initial (factor)  income distribution is more
mixed,  even among  the strongest  reform-  rural  development  and  human  resources.  unequal.
ers.  Among initial conditions  conducive  topro-
The role of poor infrastructure  and  de-  poorgrowth,  literacyplays  a notablyposi-  The median  voter hypothesis  is important
ficient  public  services  has  received  little  tive role.  to endogenous  growth  theories  because  it
attention  in  the  economic  literature,  provides  the political  mechanism  through
where  the  effect  of public  spending  and  Ravallion  and Datt  use 20 household  sur-  which  voters  in  more  unequal  countries
investment  on growth  is shown  to be  at  veys for India's  15 major states,  spanning  redistribute  a  greater  proportion  of in-
best  ambiguous.  1960-94,  to study  how initial  conditions  come  and thus  (it is argued),  by blunting
Reinikka  and  Svensson  use  unique  and  the sectoral  composition  of economic  incentives,  reduce  the  country's  growth
microeconomic  evidence  to show  the  ef-  growth  interact  to influence  how  much  rate.
fects  of poor  infrastructure  services  on  economic  growth  reduced  poverty.  But the  hypothesis  was never  properly
private  investment  in Uganda.  They find  The elasticities  of measured  poverty  to  tested  because  of lack of data  on the dis-
that  poor  public  capital,  proxied  by  an  farm yields and development  spending  did  tribution  of (pre-tax  and  transfer)  factor
unreliable  and inadequate  power  supply,  not differ  significantly  across  states.  income  across  households,  and hence  on
significantly  reduces  productive  private  But the elasticities  of poverty  to (urban  the  exact  amount  of gain  by the  poorest
investment.  and rural)  nonfarm  output  varied  appre-  quintile  or poorest  half.
Firms  can  substitute  for  inadequate  ciably, and the differences  were quantita-  Milanovic tests  the hypothesis  using  79
provision  of public capital  by investing  in  tively important  to the overall rate  of pov-  observations  drawn  from household  bud-
it themselves.  This  comes at a cost,  how-  erty reduction.  get surveys  from 24 democracies.  The data
ever:  the  installation  of less  productive  States  with initially  lower farm produc-  strongly  support  the hypothesis  that  coun-
capital.  tivity,  lower  rural  living  standards  rela-  tries  with  more  unequal  distribution  of
These  results  have clear  policy implica-  tive  to those  in  urban  areas,  and  lower  factor  income  redistribute  more  in favor
tions.  Although  macroeconomic  reforms  literacy  experienced  a  less  pro-poor  ofthe  poor - even when the analysis  con-
and stabilization  are necessary  conditions  growth  process.  trols  for the  older  people's  share  in total
for sustained  growth  and private  invest-  This paper  - a joint  product  of Poverty  population  (that  is, for pension  transfers).
ment,  without  an accompanying  improve-  and  Human  Resources,  Development  The  evidence  on the  median  voter  hy-
ment  in the  public  sector's  performance,  Research  Group,  and the  Poverty  Reduc-  pothesis  is much  weaker.
the  private  supply  response  to macroeco-  tion  and  Economic  Management  Sector  Milanovic  does find that  middle-income
nomic  policy  reform  is  likely  to  remain  Unit,  South  Asia  Region  - is part  of a  groups  gain  more  (or  lose  less)  through
limited.  larger  effort in the  Bank  to better  under-  redistribution  in  countries  where  initial
This  paper  - a product  of Public  Eco-  stand  the conditions  required  for pro-poor  (factor)  income  distribution  is more  un-
nomics and Macroeconomics  and Growth,  growth.  Copies of the paper  are  available  equal.  This  regularity  evaporates,  how-
Development  Research  Group  - is part  free from the World  Bank,  1818 H Street,  ever,  when  pensions  are  dropped  from
of a  larger  effort  in  the  group  to  study  NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  Please  con-  social transfers  and the focus is strictly  on
public  service  delivery  and  economic  tact  Joseph  Israel,  room  MC8-174,  tele-  the more  redistributive  social  transfers.
growth.  Copies of the paper  are  available  phone  202-458-5117,  fax  202-522-1557,  This paper  - a product  of Poverty  and
free from the World Bank,  1818 H Street,  email  address  jisrael@worldbank.org.  Human  Resources,  Development  Re-
NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  Please  con-  Policy Research  Working  Papers  are also  search  Group  - is part  of a larger  effort
tact Hedy Sladovich,  room MC2-609, tele-  posted  on the Web at www.worldbank.org/  in the group  to study  the relationship  be-
phone  202-473-7698,  fax  202-522-1154,  research/workingpapers.  The  authors  tween  democracy  and  inequality.  The
email address  hsladovich@worldbank.org.  may  be  contacted  atmravallion  study  was  funded  in  part  by the  Bank's
Policy Research  Working  Papers  are  also  @worldbank.org  or gdatt@worldbank.org.  Research  Support  Budget  under  the  re-
posted on the Web at www.worldbank.org/  (33 pages)  search  project  "Democracy,  Redistribu-2  Policy Research Working Paper Series
tion, and Inequality" (RPO 683-01). Cop-  interest  income to total  income, and  of  deaths:  immunization  against  measles,
ies of the paper are available free from the  loans to borrowings - help predict sub-  oral  rehydration salts, and access  to health
World  Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  Washing-  sequent distress  and closure.  care.
ton, DC 20433. Please contact  Patricia  * None of the foreign-controlled insti-
Sader, room MC3-556,  telephone 202-473-  tutions was closed, and foreign portfolio  The AIDS epidemic is dramatically  in-
3902, fax 202-522-1153, email  address  ownership lowered an institution's  prob-  creasing mortality of adults in many Sub-
psader@worldbank.org. Policy Research  ability of distress.  Saharan  African countries,  with poten-
Working Papers  are  also posted  on the  *  "Connections"  - with  industrial  tially severe consequences for surviving
Web  at  www.worldbank.org/research/  groups or influential families - increased  family members. Until now,  most of  these
workingpapers. The author may be con-  the probability of distress, suggesting that  impacts had not been quantified.
tacted at bmilanovic@worldbank.org.  (50  supervisors had granted forbearance from  Ainsworth  and  Semali  examine  the
pages)  regulations.  Connections also made clo-  impact of adult mortality in Tanzania on
sure more, not less, likely - suggesting  three measures of health  among children
that  the  closure  processes  themselves  under five: morbidity, height for age, and
2265. The Political Economy  were transparent.  weight for height. The children hit hard-
of Distress in East Asian  *  But  larger  institutions,  although  est by the death of a parent or other adult
Financial Institutions  more likely to be  distressed,  were  less  are those in the poorest households, those
likely to be closed, while (smaller) non-  with uneducated parents,  and those with
Paola Bongini,  Stijn  Claessens,  bank  financial  institutions  were  more  the least  access to health  care.
and Giovanni  Ferri  likely to be closed.  This suggests a "too  big  Ainsworth  and Semali also show how
(January 2000)  to fail" policy.  much three  important  health  interven-
* These policies,  together with the fact  tions - immunization against  measles,
In the East Asian crisis, "connections"  - that resolution processes were late and not  oral  rehydration  salts,  and  access  to
with industrial groups or influentialfami-  necessarily  comprehensive,  may  have  health  care - can do to mitigate the im-
lies - increased the  probability of distress  added to the overall uncertainty  and loss  pact of adult mortality.  These programs
forfinancial institutions. Connections  also  of confidence  in the East Asian countries,  disproportionately  improve  health  out-
made closure  more,  not less,  likely, suggest-  aggravating the financial crisis.  comes among the  poorest children  and,
ing that the closure processes themselves  This paper - a product of the Financial  within  that  group, among  children  af-
were transparent. But larger institutions,  Sector Strategy and Policy  Group, Finan-  fected by adult mortality.
although more likely to be distressed, were  cial Sector Vice Presidency - is part of a  In Tanzania  there is so much poverty
less  likely to  be closed,  suggesting  a "too  big  larger  effort in the  group to study  the  and child health indicators are so low  that
to fail" policy.  causes and resolution of financial distress.  these interventions should be targeted as
Copies  ofthe paper are available free  from  much  as  possible to the  poorest  house-
Politics and regulatory capture  can play  the  World Bank,  1818 H  Street,  NW,  holds, where the children hit hardest  by
an important role  in financial institutions'  Washington,  DC 20433. Please contact  adult mortality are most likely to be found.
distress. East  Asia's financial crisis fea-  Rose Vo, room MC9-624, telephone 202-  (Conceivably, the  targeting  strategy  for
tured many distressed  and closed finan-  473-3722, fax 202-522-2031, email  ad-  middle-income  countries  with  severe
cial  intermediaries  in  an  environment  dress  hvol@worldbank.org.  Policy Re-  AIDS  epidemics, such  as  Thailand,  or
with  many  links  between  government,  search Working Papers are also posted on  countries  with  less  poverty and  better
politicians, supervisors, and financial in-  the Web  atwww.worldbank.org/research/  child health indicators might be different.)
stitutions.  This makes the East Asian fi  workingpapers. The authors may be con-  This paper - a product of Poverty and
nancial crisis  a good event for studying  tacted  at  pbongini@mi.unicatt.it,  Human  Resources,  Development  Re-
how such connections  affect the resolution  cclaessens@Cworldbank.org,  or  gferri  search Group-is  part of  a larger research
of financial institutions'  distress.  @worldbank.org.  (22 pages)  project on "The Economic  Impact of Fatal
Bongini, Claessens, and Ferri  investi-  Adult  Illness  due  to AIDS  and  Other
gate distress and closure decisions for 186  Causes  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa" (RPO
banks  and 97 nonbank financial institu-  2266. The Impact of Adult Deaths  675-71). The  study  was funded  by the
tions in Indonesia, the Republic of Korea  on Children's Health in  Bank's Research Support Budget. Copies
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.  Northwestern  Tanzania  of this  paper are  available free from the
They find that after July 1997,42 percent  World Bank, 1818 H Street, NW, Wash-
of the  institutions  experienced distress  Martha  Ainsworth  and Innocent  Semali  ington, DC 20433. Please contact Sheila
(were closed, merged, or recapitalized, or  (January 2000)  Fallon,  room MC3-558, telephone  202-
had  their  operations  temporarily  sus-  473-8009, fax  202-522-1153, email  ad-
pended). By July  1999, 13 percent of all  In Tanzania, a poor country experiencing  dress sfallon@worldbank.org. Policy Re-
institutions  in existence in July 1997 had  a  severe AIDS  epidemic,  the  children  search Working Papers are also posted on
been closed.  whose health is hit hardest by the death of  the Web at www.worldbank.org/research/
Using financial data for 1996, the au-  a parent  or other adult  are those in  the  workingpapers. The authors  may be con-
thors find that:  poorest  households, those  with uneducated  tacted at mainsworth@worldbank.org or
* Traditional  CAMEL-type variables  parents, and thosewith  the least access to  isemali@muchs.ac.tz. (35 pages)
- returns on assets, loan growth, and the  health care. Three 10*qrtant health inter-
ratio of  loan loss reserves to capital, ofnet  ventions  mitigate  the  impact  of  adultPolicy  Research Working Paper Series  3
2267.  Do  High  Interest  Rates  and  wealth  interact  to generate  within-  be  contacted  at  dfilmer@worldbank.org.
Defend Currencies during  country inequalities in educational enroll-  (42 pages)
Speculative Attacks?  ment  and  attainment.  He carries  out
multivariate  analysis  to assess the partial
Aart Kraay  relationship  between  educational  out-  2269. Context  Is Everything:
(January 2000)  comes and  gender,  wealth,  household  Measuring Institutional Change
characteristics  (including level of educa-  in Transition Economies
No  - there  is no systematic  association  tion of adults  in the household),  and com-
between  interest  rates and  the outcome  of  munity  characteristics  (including  the  Nauro F. Campos
speculative  attacks.  presence  of schools in the community).  He  (January  2000)
finds  that:
Drawing  on evidence  from a large sample  * Women  are  at  a  great  educational  What  aspects  of institution  building  most
of speculative  attacks  in  industrial  and  disadvantage  in countries  in South  Asia  affect the transition  to a market  economy?
developing  countries,  Kraay  argues  that  and  North,  Western,  and  Central  Africa.  In terms of effects onper capita income and
high interest  rates  do not  defend  curren-  *  Gender  gaps  are large in a subset  of  school enrollment,  the rule of law  may be
cies against  speculative  attacks.  In  fact,  countries,  but  wealth  gaps  are  large  in  most important.  In terms oflife expectancy,
there  is a striking  lack of any systematic  almost  all of the countries  studied.  More-  the quality  ofthe bureaucracyplays  a more
association  between  interest  rates  and the  over,  in some countries  where  there  is a  crucial  role.
outcome  of speculative  attacks.  heavy  female  disadvantage  in enrollment
The lack  of clear  empirical  evidence  on  (Egypt,  India,  Morocco, Niger,  and  Paki-  Campos  presents  measures  with which to
the  effects  of high  interest  rates  during  stan),  wealth  interacts  with  gender  to  map  institution  building  during  the tran-
speculative  attacks  mirrors  the  theoreti-  exacerbate  the  gap  in  educational  out-  sition  from  centrally  planned  to market
cal  ambiguities  on this  issue.  comes. In India,  for example,  where  there  economies.  Data  collection and indicators
This  paper  - a product  of Macroeco-  is a  2.5  percentage  point  difference  be-  are measured  in terms  of five institutional
nomics  and  Growth,  Development  Re-  tween  male  and  female  enrollment  for  dimensions  of governance:
search  Group  - is part  of a larger  effort  children  from the richest  households,  the  *  Accountability  of the  executive
in the  group  to study  the  causes  and con-  difference  is 34 percentage  points for chil-  *  Quality  of the bureaucracy
sequences  of financial  crises.  Copies of the  dren  from the  poorest  households.  *  Rule of law
paper  are  available  free  from  the  World  *  The  education  level  of adults  in the  *  Character  of policymaking  process
Bank,  1818 H Street,  NW, Washington,  household  has a significant  impact  on the  *  Strength  of civil society.
DC 20433.  Please  contact  Rina  Bonfield,  enrollment  of children  in all the countries  Campos  highlights  the differences  over
room MC3-354, telephone  202-473-1248,  studied,  even after  controlling  for wealth.  time  and  between  Central  and  Eastern
fax 202-522-3518,  email address  abonfield  The effect  of the  education  level  of adult  European  countries  and  those  of  the
@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  Work-  females  is larger  than  that  of the  educa-  former  Soviet  Union.
ing Papers  are  also posted  on the Web at  tion level  of adult  males  in some, but  not  In terms  of effects  on per  capita  income
w w w .w o r l d b a n k .o r g / r e s e a r c h /  all, of the  countries  studied.  and school enrollment,  Campos  finds  the
workingpapers.  The  author  may  be  con-  *  The presence  of a primary  and a sec-  rule  of law to be the most important  insti-
tacted  at  akraay@worldbank.org.  (45  ondary  school in the community  has a sig-  tutional  dimension,  both for the sample  as
pages)  nificant  relationship  with  enrollment  in  a whole  and  for  differences  between  the
some countries  only (notably  in Western  two regions.
and  Central  Africa).  The relationship  ap-  In terms  of life expectancy,  however, the
2268.  The Structure  of Social  pears  not  to  systematically  differ  by  quality  of the bureaucracy  plays the most
Disparities in Education:  children's gender.  crucial role.
Gender  and Wealth  This paper  - a product  of Poverty  and  One important  message  Campos  draws
Human  Resources,  Development  Re-  from  the  results  is  that  institutions  do
Deon Filmer  search  Group  - was  prepared  as  back-  change  over time and  are by no means  as
(January 2000)  ground  to, and with support  from, a World  immutable  as  the  literature  has  sug-
Bank  Policy  Research  Report  on gender  gested.  The range  offeasible  policy choices
Wealth  gaps  in educational  outcomes  are  and  development.  Part  of the  study  was  (for changing  institutions)  may  be much
large in many  developing  countries.  And  funded  by the  Bank's  Research  Support  wider  than  is often  assumed.
gendergaps,  though  absent  in many  soci-  Budget  under  the  research  project  "Edu-  This paper  is a product  of Development
eties,  are  large  in  some,  particularly  in  cational  Enrollment  and  Dropout"  (RPO  Policy,  Development  Economics  Senior
South  Asia and  North,  Western,  and  Cen-  682-11). Copies of this paper  are available  Vice Presidency.  Copies  of the  paper  are
tralAfrica.  In some countries  with a female  free from the World Bank,  1818 H Street,  available  free from the World Bank,  1818
disadvantage,  household  wealth interacts  NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  Please  con-  H  Street,  NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.
with  gender  to create  an especially  large  tact  Sheila  Fallon,  room  MC3-558,  tele-  Please  contact  Jason  Victor,  room  MC4-
gender  gap among  the poor.  phone  202-473-8009,  fax  202-522-1153,  362,telephone202-473-6549,fax202-522-
email  address  sfallon@worldbank.org.  1158,  email  address  jvictor@worldbank.
Using  internationally  comparable  house-  Policy Research  Working  Papers  are also  org. Policy Research  Working  Papers  are
hold data  sets  (Demographic  and  Health  posted  on the Web at www.worldbank.org/  also  posted  on  the  Web  at  www.
Surveys),  Filmer  investigates  how gender  research/workingpapers.  The author  may  worldbank.org/research/workingpapers.4  Policy Research Working Paper Series
The author  may be contacted at  nauro.  tors in financial crises in both emerging  nancial systems have less risky financing
campos@cerge.cuni.cz.  (38 pages)  markets  and  industrial  countries.  Ana-  patterns.
lysts have pointed to weak corporate per-  * Stronger  protection  of  equity  and
formance and risky financing patterns  as  creditor rights is also associated with less
2270.  The  Optimal  Income  Tax  major causes of the East Asian financial  financial risk.
When  Poverty  Is  a Public  "Bad"  crisis. And some have argued that  com-  This paper-a  productofthe Financial
pany  balance sheet  problems  may also  Sector Strategy and Policy  Group, Finan-
Waly  Wane  have played a role, independent  of mac-  cial Sector Vice Presidency - is part of a
(January 20000)  roeconomic or other weaknesses, includ-  larger effort in the Bank to study the de-
ing poor  corporate sector  performance.  terminants  of the  riskiness of countries'
Suppose that poverty is a negative exter-  But  little  is known about the  empirical  corporate and financial systems. Copies  of
nality affecting individuals'welfare.  How  importance  of firm financing choices in  the  paper  are  available  free from  the
does  the  introduction  of concern about  predicting and explaining financial insta-  World Bank, 1818 H Street, NW, Wash-
poverty affect the income tax policy of a  bility.  ington, DC 20433.  Please contact Rose Vo,
social  planner?  Firm financing patterns have long been  room MC9-624, telephone 202-473-3722,
studied  by the  corporate finance  litera-  fax  202-522-2031, email  address  hvol
Wane considers poverty as an aggregate  ture.  Financing patterns  have tradition-  @worldbank.org. Policy Research Work-
negative externality that affects people  in  ally been  analyzed  in  the  Modigliani-  ing Papers are also posted on the Web at
different ways, depending on their  aver-  Miller framework, expanded to incorpo-  www .w orl  db a nk.  o rg/re  s e a rc h/
sion to poverty.  rate  taxes  and  bankruptcy  costs. More  workingpapers. The authors may be con-
If society is on average averse to pov-  recently, asymmetric information issues  tacted  at  cclaessens@worldbank.org,
erty, then  the optimal income tax sched-  have drawn attention to agency costs and  sdjankov@worldbank.org,  or  tnenova
ule displays negative marginal tax rates,  their  impact on firm financing  choices.  @worldbank.org.  (52 pages)
at least for less skilled individuals. Nega-  There is also an important  literature  re-
tive marginal tax rates play the role of a  lating financing patterns  to firm perfor-
Pigouvian  earnings subsidy, fostering the  mance and governance.  2272.  Ownership  versus
supply of poor individuals  to provide la-  Several recent studies have focused on  Environment:  Disentangling
bor. The result of no distortion at the end-  identifying systematic cross-country dif-  the  Sources  of Public  Sector
points, which is therefore violated, can be  ferences in firmn  financing patterns - and  Inefficiency
restored  once the  focus is  shifted  from  the effects of these differences on finan-
individual to social distortions.  cial  sector  development  and  economic  Ann P. Bartel and Ann E. Harrison
This paper - a product of Public Eco-  growth.  They have  also  examined  the  (January 2000)
nomics, Development Research Group - causes  of different  financing  patterns,
is part of a larger  effort in the  group to  particularly  countries' legal and institu-  Is public sector inefficiency due primarily
better understand  public policy and pov-  tional environments.  to agency-type problems ("ownership")  or
erty. Copies  of the paper are available free  The literature  has devoted little atten-  to the environment in which public enter-
from the World  Bank, 1818 H Street, NW,  tion to corporate sector risk characteris-  prises operate (as measured by soft bud-
Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact  tics,  however, aside from  leverage and  get constraints or barriers  to competition)?
Hedy  Sladovich,  room  MC2-609, tele-  debt maturity considerations. Even these  Both.
phone  202-473-7698, fax 202-522-1154,  measures  have been the  subject  of few
email address hsladovich@worldbank.org.  empirical investigations, mainly because  Bartel and Harrison  compare the perfor-
Policy  Research Working Papers are also  of a paucity of data  on corporate sectors  mance of public and private sector manu-
posted on the  Web at  www.worldbank.  around the world.  facturing firms in Indonesia for 1981-95.
org/research/workingpapers.  The author  Building  on data  that  have  recently  They analyze whether  public sector inef-
may be contacted at wwane@worldbank.  become available,  Claessens,  Djankov,  ficiency is due primarily  to agency-type
org. (34 pages)  and Nenova try to fill this gap in the lit-  problems ("ownership') or to the business
erature and shed light on the risk charac-  environment in which public enterprises
teristics  of corporate sectors around the  operate, as measured by soft budget con-
2271.  Corporate  Risk  around  world. They  investigate  how  corporate  straints  or barriers  to competition.
the  World  sectors' financial and operating structures  They nest the two alternatives  in a pro-
relate to the institutional  environment in  duction function framework.
Stijn Claessens,  Simeon  Djankov,  which they operate, using data for more  The results, obtained from fixed-effects
and Tatiana Nenova  than  11,000 firms in 46 countries. They  specifications,  provide support  for both
(January 2000)  show that:  models.
The origins of a country's laws, the  The  business  environment  matters.
Corporate  financing patterns around the  strength of its equity and creditor rights,  Only  public  enterprises  that  received
world reflect countries'institutional  envi-  and the nature of its financial system can  loans from state banks  or those shielded
ronments.  account for the degree of corporate risk-  from import competition performed worse
taking.  than private enterprises.
Weaknesses in the corporate sector have  * In  particular,  corporations  in com-  Ownership matters. For a given level of
increasingly been cited as important  fac-  mon law countries and  market-based  fi-  import competition or soft loans, publicPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  5
enterprises  perform  worse  than  their  Their results indicate that the value of  * Government involvement in provid-
counterparts  in the private sector.  preventing malaria with vaccines is about  ing water services, especially locally,  sig-
Eliminating  soft loans  to Indonesia's  US$36 a  household a year, or about  15  nificantly reduces child mortality.
public  enterprises  would  raise total factor  percent of imputed annual household in-  * Private or parastatal  participation in
productivity by 6 percentage points; the  come. This is, on average, about two or  providing sewerage connections is associ-
same result could be achieved by increas-  three  times the  expected household cost  ated with low child mortality.
ing import penetration  by 15 percentage  of illness.  * Rapid urban growth and high levels
points.  Despite  the greatbenefits from prevent-  of poverty within the  city are correlated
Bartel  and  Harrison  show that  these  ing malaria, the fact that vaccine  demand  with high child mortality.
findings are not due to selection  effects for  is price inelastic  suggests that  it will be  This  paper  - a  product of Finance,
either privatization  or the receipt of soft  difficult  to  achieve significant  market  Development Research Group - is part
loans.  penetration  unless the vaccine is subsi-  of a larger effort in the group to study the
This paper - a product of Poverty and  dized.  relationship between finance and poverty
Human  Resources,  Development  Re-  The authors  obtain similar results  for  reduction.  Copies of the paper are avail-
search  Group  - was  part  of  a  study  insecticide-treated  bed nets.  Their esti-  able free from the World Bank, 1818 H
funded by the Bank's Research Support  mates of household demand functions for  Street,  NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.
Budget under  the research  project 'The  bed nets suggest that at a price that might  Please contact Paulina  Sintim-Aboagye,
Impact of Labor Market Policies and In-  permit cost  recovery (US$6  a bed net), only  room MC3-422, telephone 202-473-7644,
stitutions  on  Economic  Performance"  a third of the population of a 200-person  fax  202-522-1155,  email  address
(RPO 680-96). Copies of the  paper  are  village would sleep under bed nets.  psintimaboagye@worldbank.org.  Policy
available free from the World Bank, 1818  This paper  - a product of Infrastruc-  Research Working Papers are also posted
H Street,  NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  ture and Environment, Development Re-  on the  Web at  www.worldbank.org/re-
Please contact Sheila Fallon, room MC3-  search Group - is part of a larger effort  search/workingpapers. The author maybe
558,  telephone 202-473-8009,  fax 202-522-  in the group to promote efficient resource  contacted  at  ashi@worldbank.org.  (31
1153, email address sfallon@worldbank.  allocation within the  health sector. Cop-  pages)
org. Policy Research Working Papers are  ies of  the paper are available free from the
also  posted  on  the  Web  at  www.  World Bank, 1818 H Street,  NW, Wash-
worldbank.org/research/workingpapers.  ington, DC 20433. Please contact Tourya  2275. Who Gained from Vietnam's
Ann  Harrison  may  be  contacted  at  Tourougui,  room MC2-521,  telephone 202-  Boom in the 1990s? An Analysis of
aharriso@research.gsb.columbia.edu. (45  458-7431, fax 202-522-3230, email  ad-  Poverty and Inequality Trends
pages)  dress ttourougui@worldbank.org. Policy
Research Working Papers are also posted  Paul Glewwe,  Michele  Gragnolati,
on  the  Web at  www.worldbank.org/re-  and Hassan Zaman
2273. The Value of Preventing  search/workingpapers.  The authors  may  (January 2000)
Malaria in Tembien, Ethiopia  be contacted at mcropper@worldbank.org,
jlampietti@worldbank.org,  Vietnam's gains in poverty reduction be-
Maureen  L. Cropper,  Mitiku  Haile,  cpoulos@email.unc.edu,  or  dwhittin  tween 1992 and  1998 were striking, and
Julian A. Lampietti,  Christine  Poulos,  @imap.unc.edu. (75 pages)  the country's impressive growth has been
and Dale  Whittington  fairly broad-based. Households that have
(January 2000)  benefited most are well-educated, urban,
2274. How Access to Urban  white-collar  households, while  agricul-
Despite the great benefits from preventing  Potable Water and Sewerage  tural workers,  ethnic minorities, and those
malaria, the fact that vaccine demand  is  Connections Affects  Child  residing in poorer regions  haveprogressed
price inelastic suggests that it will be dif-  Mortality  least.
ficult to achieve significant  market pen-
etration unless the vaccine is subsidized.  Anqing  Shi  Glewwe, Gragnolati,  and  Zaman assess
The results are similarfor bed nets treated  (January 2000)  the extent  to which Vietnam's rapid eco-
with insecticide.  nomic growth in the 1990s was accompa-
Lower child mortality is associated with  nied by reductions in poverty. They also
Cropper,  Haile,  Lampietti,  Poulos, and  improved access to urban potable water  investigate factors that contribute to cer-
Whittington measure the monetary value  and  sewerage connections, government  tain  households  benefiting  more  than
households place on preventing malaria  involvement in the provision of local wa-  others.
in Tembien, Tigray Region,  Ethiopia. They  ter services,  and private orparastatalpar-  Using information from two household
estimate a household demand function for  ticipation in the provision of sewerage  con-  surveys, the  Vietnam  Living Standards
a hypothetical malaria  vaccine and com-  nections.  Surveys (VNLSS)  for 1992-93 and 1997-
pute  the value of preventing  malaria  as  98, they  show that  Vietnam's  gains  in
the household's maximum willingness to  Using a city-level database  of Global Ur-  poverty reduction  were striking  during
pay to provide  vaccines for all family mem-  ban Indicators,  Shi finds that:  this period and that the country's impres-
bers.  They contrast  willingness  to pay  *  Improved  access to  urban  potable  sive growth has been fairly broad-based.
with the traditional  costs of illness (medi-  water and sewerage connections is consis-  After discussing descriptive statistics
cal costs and time lost because of malaria).  tently associated with low  child mortality.  for both years, the authors  examine fac-6  Policy Research Working Paper Series
tors  contributing  to  poverty  reduction  other  things,  Panagariya  concludes  including  crises  in  other  parts  of  the
using both simple decomposition analysis  that:  world.
and a multinomial logit model.  The results  *  Under perfect competition, a country
show that:  trying  to  retaliate  against  a  trading  To analyze the main determinants of sec-
* Returns  to education increased sig-  partner's  export subsidies by instituting  ondary market prices of Bulgarian Brady
nificantly during this period, particularly  its  own export subsidies  will only hurt  bonds, Budina and Mantchev investigate
for higher levels of education.  itself.  to what  extent  fluctuations  in domestic
* Location  significantly  affected  a  *  The argument that export subsidies  fundamentals affect the bonds' secondary
household's probability of escaping pov-  may be useful for neutralizing import tar-  market price.
erty during this period. Urban households  iffs is spurious.  In most practical  situa-  They also assess the extent to which ex-
enjoyed a  greater  reduction  in poverty  tions, this is not possible. Removal of tar-  ternal shocks affect  the bonds'prices. They
than did rural households,  and households  iffs is a far superior policy.  estimate, the  long-term  relationship  be-
residing in the  Red River Delta and the  *  In principle a case can be made for  tween domestic fundamentals and market
southeast  were also better  able to take  protecting infant export industries in the  prices of the  bonds, using cointegration
advantage of new opportunities.  presence of externalities.  But the empiri-  techniques.
* White-collar  households  benefited  cal relevance of externalities  remains as  In the long run, they find that gross for-
most, and agricultural  laborers the least.  illusory for export industries as it was for  eign reserves and  exports had  a positive
However, Vietnam cannot afford to be  import-substituting  industries.  effect  on bond prices and the real exchange
complacent, as nearly half its rural popu-  *  Adverse selection and moral hazard  rate and Mexico's  nominal exchange rate
lation lives  below the poverty  line, poverty  can lead to the thinning  of the market for  depreciation had a negative effect.
rates  among  ethnic  minorities  remain  credit insurance but that is not a case for  In the short run, the Asian crisis had a
very high,  and natural  calamities are  a  government intervention.  negative impact, and Bulgaria's change in
serious impediment to poverty reduction.  *  India's experience shows export sub-  political regime and introduction of a cur-
This paper-  a product of Poverty and  sidies  to have little  impact  on exports.  rency board had a positive impact.
Human  Resources,  Development  Re-  Brazil and Mexico's  experience shows ex-  Mexico's economic crisis in  1995 had
search Group - is part of a larger  effort  port subsidies to be a costly instrument  of  contagion effects.
in the group to understand the dynamics  export diversification.  The authors'  empirical results  confirm
of poverty. Copies of the paper are avail-  *  Those who argue that  pro-export in-  the view that  the so-called fundamentals
able free from the  World Bank, 1818 H  terventions  were important  in East Asia  approach should be used to supplement
Street,  NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.  have not provided convincing evidence of  the analysis of  spillover effects for Bulgar-
Please contact Patricia Sader, room MC3-  a causal relationship  between the inter-  ian Brady bonds.
556,  telephone 202-473-3902,  fax 202-522-  ventions and growth.  This paper-a  product  of Macroeconom-
1153, email address psader@worldbank.  This paper - a product of Trade, De-  ics  and  Growth, Development Research
org. Policy  Research Working Papers are  velopment Research Group - is part of a  Group-is  part of  a larger effort  in the group
also  posted  on  the  Web  at  www.  larger  effort in the group to explore con-  to study transition economies.  Copies  of the
worldbank.org/research/workingpapers.  ceptual and practical issues in the export  paperareavailableffreefromtheWorldBank,
The  authors  may  be  contacted  at  policies of developing countries. Copies of  1818  H Street, NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.
p g I e w w e @d e p t. a g e c o n. u m n. e d u,  the  paper  are  available  free from  the  Please  contact  Nina Budina, room  MC3-353,
mgragnolati@worldbank.org, or hzaman  World Bank, 1818 H Street, NW, Wash-  telephone 202-458-2045,  fax 202-522-3518,
:worldbank.org.  (55 pages)  ington,  DC 20433.  Please  contact  Lili  email  address  nbudina@worldbank.org.
Tabada,  room MC3-333, telephone 202-  Policy Research Working Papers are also
473-6896, fax 202-522-1159, email  ad-  posted on the Web at www.worldbank.org/
2276.  Evaluating  the  Case  dress  ltabada@worldbank.org. Policy Re-  research/workingpapers.  TzvetanMantchev
for Export  Subsidies  search Working  Papers  are also posted  on  maybecontactedattrmantchev@hotmail.com.
the Web at www.worldbank.org/research/  (30 pages)
Arvind  Panagariya  workingpapers.  The author  may be con-
(January 2000)  tacted  at  panagari@econ.umd.edu.  (30
pages)  2278. Liquidity Constraints and
With import-substitution policies discred-  Investment in Transition
ited, many have argued for interventions  Economies: The Case of Bulgaria
on behalf of export interests. But  aren't  2277. Determinants of Bulgarian
arguments for export subsidies as flawed  Brady Bond Prices: An Empirical  Nina Budina, Harry Garretsen,
as arguments for import substitution?  Assessment  and Eelke  de Jong
(January 2000)
Now  that  import-substitution  policies  Nina Budina  and Tzvetan  Mantchev
have failed and been discredited, there has  (January 2000)  In  Bulgaria and other transition econo-
been a shift in favor of interventions  on  mies, liquidity  constraints and hence ac-
behalf  of export  interests.  Panagariya  Macroeconomic variables and changes in  cess to external funds must be seen in the
argues that  close scrutiny  reveals these  foreign reserues  affect the secondary mar-  context of soft budget constraints and the
arguments to be as flawed as the old ar-  ket price of Brady  bonds in Bulgaria. So  financial  system's failure to enforce the
guments for import substitution.  Among  do changes in the external enuironment,  efficient allocation  offunds. Liquidity con-Policy Research Working Paper Series  7
straints in Bulgaria may be seen as a sign  capital into the transport infrastructure  Institute  - is part of a larger effort in the
of financial  weakness.  sector.  institute  to increase  understanding  of in-
frastructure  regulation.  Copies of the pa-
Budina,  Garretsen,  and de Jong  use firm  To increase  investment  in infrastructure,  per  are  available  free  from  the  World
level  data  on Bulgaria  to investigate  the  in  the  early  1990s  Chile's  government  Bank,  1818 H Street NW, Washington,  DC
impact  of liquidity  constraints  on firms'  introduced  private  capital  into the  trans-  20433.  Please  contact  Gabriela  Chenet-
investment  performance.  port infrastructure  sector,  covering  roads  Smith,  room  J3-147,  telephone  202-473-
Internal  funds  are an important  deter-  and  highways,  bridges,  tunnels,  and  air-  6370,  fax  202-676-9874,  email  address
minant  of investment  in most  industrial  ports.  The  chosen  mechanism:  a conces-  gchenet@worldbank.org.  Policy Research
economies.  The  authors  use a simple  ac-  sion scheme through  which  private  firms  Working  Papers  are  also  posted  on  the
celerator  model  of  investment  to  test  would  finance  and  build  a given  project  Web  at  www.worldbank.org/research/
whether  liquidity  constraints  are relevant  and then  operate  the infrastructure  for a  workingpapers.  Andres  G6mez-Lobo may
in  Bulgaria's  case.  Their  estimates  are  set number  of years,  recovering  their  in-  be  contacted  at  agomezlo@decon.facea.
based  on  data  for  1993-95,  before  vestment  by collecting  tolls  from  users.  uchile.cl.  (51 pages)
Bulgaria's  financial  crisis  of 1996-97.  Among lessons  learned  from the  expe-
It  turns  out  that  Bulgarian  firms  are  rience:
liquidity-constrained  and that  firms'  size  *  As  much  as  possible,  avoid  2280.  Willingness to Pay for Air
and financial  structure  help to distinguish  concessioning  roads  for which  there  are  Quality  Improvements  in Sofia,
between  firms  that  are  more  and  less  li-  convenient  alternative  freeways  nearby.  Bulgaria
quidity-constrained.  *  Choose the right  variable  for award-
In  the  authors'  view,  liquidity  con-  ing a concession.  Avoid mechanisms  that  Hua Wang and Dale Whittington
straints  in transition  economies should  be  (by promoting  large payments  to the state  (January  2000)
interpreted  in different  ways  than  those  or short-term  concession  periods)  encour-
in industrial  economies.  In  Bulgaria,  li-  age high tolls,  and if you choose to award  People in Sofia  are willing  to pay 4.2 per-
quidity  constraints  and  hence  access  to  a concession  to the firm  charging  the low-  cent of their  income or more for a program
external  funds  should  be seen  in the con-  est tolls,  place a floor  and ceiling  on pos-  to improve  air  quality.
text  of soft budget  constraints  and the  fi-  sible  bids.  The  floor is  to guarantee  the
nancial  system's  failure  to enforce  the ef-  concession's  financial  viability;  the ceiling  Through  a survey,  Wang and Whittington
ficient  allocation  of funds.  is to prevent  inefficient  traffic  diversions.  study willingness  to pay for improvements
The relationship  between  liquidity  con-  Ties at either  end should  be resolved  by a  in air  quality  in Sofia, Bulgaria.
straints  and firm  characteristics  may  ac-  second variable,  such as the level oftrans-  Using  a  stochastic  payment  card  ap-
tually  be the opposite  of what  is normally  fers  between  the  state  and the  firm.  proach  - asking  respondents  the  likeli-
the  case  in industrial  countries.  In  Bul-  *  Allow  downward  toll  flexibility  so  hood that  they  would  agree  to pay  a se-
garia,  lack of liquidity  constraints  may be  that  the concessionaire  can react  to unex-  ries  of prices  - they  estimate  the  distri-
a sign of financial  weakness.  pectedly  low traffic  flows,  especially  for  bution of willingness  to pay various  prices.
This paper  - a product ofMacroeconom-  certain  types  of vehicles.  They find  that  people  in Sofia are will-
ics  and  Growth,  Development  Research  *  Pay  special  attention  to the  tender-  ing to pay up to about  4.2 percent  of their
Group  - is part  of a larger  effort  in the  ing  mechanism  and to the  general  incen-  income for a program  to improve  air qual-
group to study  transition  economies.  Cop-  tive structure.  There  are limits  to the pure  ity. The income elasticity  of willingness  to
ies of the paper  are available  free from the  least-present-value-of-revenue  (LPVR)  pay for air quality  improvements  is about
World Bank,  1818 H Street,  NW, Washing-  auction,  but  income  guarantees  do  en-  27 percent.
ton, DC 20433. Please contactNina  Budina,  hance  liquidity,  In  fact,  a minimum-in-  For comparison,  they  also used  the ref-
room  MC3-353, telephone  202-458-2045,  come guarantee  through  an LPVR auction  erendum  contingent  valuation  approach.
fax 202-522-3518,  email  address  nbudina  is an instrument  for credit  enhancement,  Results  from  that  approach  yielded  a
@worldbank.org.  Policy Research  Working  not  income  support.  Alternatively,  some  higher  estimate  of willingness  to pay.
Papers  are  also  posted  on  the  Web  at  form  of financial  innovation  should  be  This  paper  - a product  of Infrastruc-
w w w .w o r l d b a n k.  o r g/r  e s e arc  h/  encouraged  to make  debt  service  commit-  ture  and Environment,  Development  Re-
workingpapers.  The other  authors  may be  ments  more  flexible.  search  Group  - is part  of a larger  effort
contacted  at  h.garretsen@bw.kun.nl  or  *  If concessions  are tendered  by tradi-  in the group  to understand  the economics
e.dejong@bw.kun.nl.  (28 pages)  tional  methods  and  income  guarantees  of pollution  control  in  developing  coun-
will be given,  cover only a fraction  of the  tries.  Copies of the paper are available  free
concessionaire's  expected  income  stream,  from the World Bank,  1818 H Street,  NW,
2279.  Broad Roads in a Thin  to  reduce  the  state's  financial  exposure  Washington,  DC  20433.  Please  contact
Country: Infrastructure  and to improve  the incentives  to the con-  Roula  Yazigi,  room  MC2-533,  telephone
Concessions in Chile  cessionaire.  202-473-7176,  fax  202-522-3230,  email
*  Make  the  contracts  as  complete  as  address  ryazigi@worldbank.org.  Policy
Andres G6mez-Lobo  and Sergio Hinojosa  possible  but  allow for later  modifications  Research  Working  Papers  are also posted
(January 2000)  or renegotiations,  and  include  a well-de-  on  the  Web  at  www.worldbank.org/re-
signed  dispute  resolution  mechanism.  search/workingpapers.  Hua Wang may be
Lessons  learned  from  Chile's  highly  suc-  This paper  - a product  of Governance,  contacted  at hwangl@worldbank.org.  (27
cessful  experience  in introducing  private  Regulation,  and  Finance,  World  Bank  pages)8  Policy Research Working Paper Series
2281. External Sustainability:  served  values  of the  country's  relative  To limit the government's exposure to
A Stock Equilibrium Perspective  returns,  risks,  and  wealth.  Then,  for a  risks, yet accommodate  investment needs
selected  group  of industrial  and  develop-  crucial  to growth  and  development,  Bul-
Cesar Calder6n, Norman Loayza,  ing countries,  they evaluate  the  extent  to  garia  must  find  an  optimal  strategy  for
and Luis Serv6n  which  actual  ratios  diverge  from  their  liability  management,  fiscal reserves,  and
(January 2000)  long-run  counterparts  - and  hence  the  risk  mitigation.  Priorities  for dealing with
sustainability  of current  net foreign  asset  existing  risks  and  limiting  further  accu-
The  1994 crisis  in Mexico,  developments  positions.  mulation  of risks  include:
in East  Asia,  and  persistent  turmoil  in  This paper-  a product  of the  Poverty  *  Mitigating  currency  and interest  rate
world financial  markets  have dramatized  Reduction  and  Economic  Management  risks  in  the  government  liability  struc-
the role of external  imbalances  in macro-  Unit,  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  ture.
economic crises. Some  believe that the cur-  Region  - is part  of a larger  effort  to as-  *  Implementing  proposed institutional
rent  account  should  be kept  from  rising  sess  the sustainability  of the external  ac-  and  finance  reform  of the  country's  pen-
beyond a "sustainable" level, some that a  counts ofthe major countries in the region.  sion and health  care systems.
current  account  surplus  is the only  solid  Copies of the paper are available  free from  *  Building  adequate  contingency  re-
externalposition.  Can those rules of thumb  the  World  Bank,  1818  H  Street,  NW,  serves.
be justified  analytically?  Washington,  DC  20433.  Please  contact  *  Introducing  risk-sharing  arrange-
Hazel Vargas,  room 18-138, telephone  202-  ments.
Calder6n,  Loayza,  and  Serv6n  consider  473-8546,  fax  202-522-2119,  email  ad-  *  Prioritizing  and placing  strict  limits
external  sustainability  from the perspec-  dress  hvargas@worldbank.org.  Policy  on the  amounts  of new guaranteed  obli-
tive  of equilibrium  in  net  foreign  asset  Research  Working  Papers  are also posted  gations.
positions.  Under  their  approach,  an exter-  on  the  Web  at  www.worldbank.org/  *  Developing  government  capacity  to
nal situation  is sustainable  if it is consis-  research/workingpapers.  The  authors  analyze  and  manage  risks.
tent  with  international  and  domestic  in-  may  be  contacted  at  nloayza@condor.  *  Fully integrating  fiscal risk manage-
vestors'  achieving  their  desired  portfolio  bcentral.cl  or Iserven@worldbank.org.  (43  ment  with  other  policy considerations  in
allocation  across  countries.  pages)  fiscal  management,  as  part  of  an  inte-
They  develop  a reduced-form  model  of  grated  asset  and  liability  management
net foreign asset  positions whose long-run  strategy.
equilibrium  condition  expresses  the ratio  2282.  Managing  Fiscal  Risk  This  paper  - a product  of the  Poverty
of net foreign assets  to the  total wealth  of  in Bulgaria  Reduction  and  Economic  Management
domestic  residents  as a negative  function  Sector  Unit,  Europe  and  Central  Asia
of investment  returns  in the country  rela-  Hana Polackova Brixi, Sergei Shatalov,  Region  - is part  of a larger  effort in the
tive  to the  rest  of  the  world,  a positive  and Leila Zlaoui  Bank to study  the quality  of fiscal adjust-
function  of investment  risk,  and  an  in-  (January 2000)  ment  in its client  countries.  Copies  of the
verse function ofthe  ratio offoreign-owned  paper  are  available  free  from  the  World
to domestically  owned  wealth.  Governments  need to manage  their contin-  Bank,  1818  H Street,  NW, Washington,
To estimate  this equilibrium  condition,  gent  liabilities  and  other  off-budget  DC  20433.  Please  contact  Leila  Zlaoui,
the authors  use a newly constructed  data  sources  of fiscal risk  - throughpolicy, the  room H4-3 17, telephone  202-473-3100, fax
set of foreign asset  and liability  stocks  for  budgetary  process,  and  an  integrated  as-  202-522-2754,  email  address  lzlaoui
a large group of industrial  and developing  set and  liability  management  strategy.  @worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  Work-
countries,  from the  1960s to the  present.  ing Papers  are also  posted  on the Web at
They  also develop  summary  measures  of  To understand  the fiscal position of a coun-  w w w .w o r I d b a n k.  o r g / r e s e a r c h /
country  returns  and  risks.  try,  contingent  liabilities  and  other  workingpapers.  The other  authors  may be
Their  econometric  methodology  is  an  sources offiscal  risk need to be considered.  contacted  at  hpolackova@worldbank.org
application  of the  Pooled  Mean  Group  Brixi,  Shatalov,  and  Zlaoui  develop  a  or sshatalov@worldbank.org.  (46 pages)
estimator  recently  developed  by Pesaran,  framework  to  assess  and  manage  fiscal
Shin,  and  Smith  (1999), which  allows  for  risk  in Bulgaria.
unrestricted  cross-country  heterogeneity  Bulgaria's  Currency  Board  Arrange-  2283.  New Tools  and  New Tests
in short-term dynamics while imposing a  ment has effectively imposed fiscal disci-  in Comparative Political Economy:
common  long-run  specification.  The esti-  pline,  but  leaves  only  limited  room  to  The  Database  of Political
mation  results  lend considerable  support  accommodate  potential  fiscal  shocks.  Institutions
to the  model,  especially  when  applied  to  Through  risks  embedded  in the  portfolio
countries  with low capital controls  or high  of  government  contingent  and  direct  Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto Groff,
or upper-middle  income.  The  results  for  liabilities,  significant  fiscal  pressures  Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh
countries  with  high  capital  controls  and,  could arise  in the future.  Major sources  of  (February 2000)
especially,  lower-income countries  are less  risk include  environmental  liabilities  and
supportive  of the stock equilibrium  model.  investment  requirements,  collection  Some  say that democracy  is more likely  to
As a by-product  of the model's  estima-  capacities  of the social protection  institu-  survive  under  parliamentary  govern-
tion, the  authors  obtain  estimates  of the  tions,  and  further  engagement  in  off-  ments.  That  result  is not robust  to the use
long-run  equilibrium  ratios  of net foreign  budget  programs,  such  as  government  of different  variables from  the Database  of
assets  to wealth,  conditional  on the  ob-  guarantees.  Political  Institutions,  a  large  newPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  9
cross-country database that may illumi-  dress  psintimaboagye@worldbank.org.  pressures  and to sell assets  back to the
nate many other issues affecting and af-  Policy  Research Working Papers are also  private sector.
fected by political institutions.  posted on the Web  atwww.worldbank.orgl  Assetmanagementcompanies  used todis-
research/workingpapers.  The  authors  pose  of  assets rapidly fared  somewhatbetter.
This paper introduces a large new cross-  may be  contacted  at  tbeck@worldbank.  Twooffouragencies(inSpainandtheUnited
country database on political institutions:  org,  gclarke@worldbank.org,  pkeefer  States) achieved  their objectives,  suggesting
the  Database  on  Political  Institutions  @worldbank.org, or pwalsh@worldbank.  that  asset management companies  can be
(DPI).  org. (46 pages)  used effectively  for  narrowlydefined  purposes
Beck, Clarke, Groff,  Keefer, and Walsh  of resolving  insolvent  and inviable  financial
summarize key variables  (many of them  institutions  and  selling off their  assets.
new), compare this data set with others,  2284. The Use of Asset  Achieving  these  objectives  required an easily
and explore the range of issues for which  Management Companies in  liquefiable  asset-  real estate -mostly  pro-
the data should prove invaluable.  the Resolution of Banking Crises:  fessional management, political indepen-
Among the novel variables they intro-  Cross-Country Experience  dence,  adequate bankruptcy  and foreclosure
duce:  laws, appropriate  funding,  skilled  resources,
* Several measures of  tenure, stability,  Daniela  Klingebiel  good  information  and management  systems,
and checks and balances.  (February  2000)  and transparent operations  and processes.
* Identification of parties with the gov-  The other two agencies (in Mexico  and
ernment coalition or the opposition.  Asset management companies have been  the  Philippines) were  doomed from the
* Fragmentation of opposition  and gov-  used to address the overhang of bad debt  start, as governments transferred to them
ernment parties in legislatures.  in a country's financial system - by expe-  politically motivated loans or fraudulent
The authors  illustrate  the application  diting corporate restructuring or rapidly  assets, which were difficult for a govern-
of DPI variables  to several  problems in  disposing of corporate assets. A study of  ment agency susceptible to political pres-
political economy.  seven cases suggests that such companies  sure and lacking independence to resolve
Stepan  and  Skach, for example,  find  tend to be ineffective at corporate restruc-  or sell off.
that  democracy is more likely to survive  turing and are good at disposing of assets  This paper - a product of  the Financial
under parliamentary  governments than  only when they're used to meet fairly nar-  Sector  Strategy and Policy  Group  - is part
presidential systems. But this result is not  row objectives in the presence of certain  of a larger effort in the group to study the
robust  to the  use of different variables  factors: an easily liquefiable asset (such as  management  of banking crises. Copies of
from the  DPI, which raises  puzzles for  real estate), mostly professional manage-  the paper areavailable free fromtheWorld
future research.  ment,  political  independence,  adequate  Bank, 1818  H Street, NW,  Washington, DC
Similarly, Roubini and Sachs find that  bankruptcy and foreclosure laws, skilled  20433.  Please contact Rose  Vo,  room MC9-
divided governments in  the  OECD run  resources,  appropriate  funding, good infor-  624,  telephone 202-473-3722,  fax 202-522-
higher budget deficits after fiscal shocks.  mation  and  management  systems,  and  2031,  email address hvol@worldbank.org.
Replication of their work using DPI indi-  transparent operations and processes.  Policy Research Working Papers are also
cators  of divided government  indicates  posted on the Web at www.worldbank.org/
otherwise,  again  suggesting  issues  for  Asset management companies have been  researchlworkingpapers. The author may
future research.  used to address the overhang of bad debt  be contacted  at dklingebiel@worldbank.org.
Among questions  in  political science  in the  financial  system.  There  are  two  (52 pages)
and economics that this database  may il-  main  types  of asset  management  com-
luminate: the determinants ofdemocratic  pany: those set up to expedite corporate
consolidation, the political conditions for  restructuring  and  those  established  for  2285.  Industrial Environmental
economic reform, the political and insti-  rapid disposal of assets.  Performance in China:
tutional roots of corruption, and the ele-  A review of seven asset  management  The Impact of Inspections
ments of appropriate and institutionally  companies reveals a mixed record. In two
sensitive design of economic policy.  of three cases, asset management compa-  Susmita  Dasgupta,  Benoit  Laplante,
This paper - a product of Regulation  nies for corporate restructuring  did not  Nlandu Mamingi,  and Hua Wang
and  Competition  Policy,  Development  achieve their  narrow  goal of expediting  (February  2000)
Research Group - is part of a larger  ef-  bank or corporate restructuring,  suggest-
fort in the group to understand  the insti-  ing that  they  are  not good vehicles  for  Inspections have a statistically significant
tutional bases of poverty alleviation and  expediting corporate restructuring.  impact on firms'  environmental perfor-
economic reform. The study was funded  Only a Swedish asset management com-  mance in the Chinese city of Zhenjiang,
by the Bank's Research Support Budget  pany successfully managed its portfolio,  and citizens'complaints have  a significant
under the research project "Database on  acting sometimes as lead agent in restruc-  impact on inspections. So stronger infor-
Institutions  for  Government  Decision-  turing  - and helped by the fact that  the  mation  and  education  campaigns  may
making" (RPO 682-79). Copies of this pa-  assets acquired had mostly to do with real  improve social welfare in the city.
per  are  available  free from  the  World  estate,  not  manufacturing,  which  is
Bank, 1818 H Street, NW, Washington,  harder to restructure,  and represented  a  Little empirical research has been done on
DC  20433. Please contact Paulina Sintim-  small  fraction  of the  banking  system's  monitoring  and  enforcement  issues  in
Aboagye,  room MC3-422, telephone 202-  assets, which made it easier for the com-  environmental  economics, especially to
473-8526, fax  202-522-1155, email  ad-  pany  to remain independent  of political  analyze  the  impact  of  monitoring  and10  Policy Research Working Paper Series
enforcement on polluters' environmental  cial liberalization. In a country wheregov-  privatization programs, how can one ac-
performance. No studies have been done  ernrnent policy is not transparent, banks  count for the puzzling behaviorof insider-
in developing economies.  may tend to increase  credit above the opti-  managers who, in stripping assets  from the
Dasgupta,  Laplante,  Mamingi,  and  mal level.  very  firms they own, appear to be stealing
Wang explore the  impact of inspections,  from one pocket to fill the other?
and the potential  impactofpollution  charges  Mehrez and  Kaufmann  investigate  how
and citizens'  complaints,  on  the environmen-  transparency  affects the probability of a  How can one account for the puzzling be-
tal performance  of polluters  in China.  financial crisis.  havior of insider-managers  who, in strip-
Their analysis of plant-level data from  They construct a model in which banks  ping assets from the very firms they own,
the city of Zhenjiang shows that:  cannot  distinguish  between  aggregate  appear to be stealing from one pocket to
* Inspections have a statistically  sig-  shocks and government policy,  on the one  fill the other?
nificant impact on firms' environmental  hand,  and  firms' quality,  on the  other.  Desai and Goldberg suggest that  such
performance.  Banks  may therefore overestimate firms'  asset-stripping  and failure to restructure
* Pollution charges do not have a sta-  returns and increase credit above  the level  are the  consequences of interactions be-
tistically significant effect on firms' per-  thatwouldbeoptimalgiventhefirms'returns.  tween insiders (manager-owners) and re-
formance - although the lack ofvariation  Once banks  discover their  large expo-  gional governments in a particular  prop-
in  pollution  charges  in  Zhenjiang  pre-  sure,  they  are  likely to roll over loans  erty  rights  regime.  In  this  regime,  the
cludes effectively  capturing their impact.  rather  than declare their losses. This de-  ability to realize value is limited by uncer-
* Complaints have a significant impact  lays the crisis but increases its magnitude.  tainty  and illiquidity, so managers  have
on inspections and therefore on pollution  The empirical evidence, based on data  little  incentive to increase value. As the
control.  for 56 countries in 1977-97, supports this  central institutions  that rule Russia have
Currently  available data do not allow  theoretical model. The authors  find that  ceded their powers to the regions, regional
analysis of whether the cost of additional  lack of transparency  increases the  prob-  governments have imposed  various distor-
inspections is justified, but itis reasonable  ability of a crisis following  financial liber-  tions  on enterprises  to protect local em-
to speculate that  additional  inspections  alization.  This  implies  that  countries  ployment.
would improve  social welfare in Zhenjiang  should focus on increasing transparency  Prospective  outsider-investors  doubt
and that information and education cam-  of  economic  activity  and  government  they can acquire  the control rights  they
paigns are probably a good  way to encour-  policy,  as well as increasing transparency  need for restructuring  firms  and  doubt
age citizen complaints.  in the  financial sector, particularly  dur-  they  can avoid the  distortions  regional
This paper - a product of Infrastruc-  ing a period of transition  such as finan-  governments impose on the firms in which
ture and Environment, Development Re-  cial liberalization.  they  might  invest.  The result:  little  re-
search Group - is part of a larger  effort  This paper - a product of Governance,  structuring  and  little  new  investment.
in the group to study environmental regu-  Regulation,  and  Finance,  World Bank  And regional governments, knowing the
lation in developing countries. The study  Institute  - is part of a larger effort in the  firms' taxable  cash flows will have been
was funded by the Bank's Research Sup-  institute  to  research  governance  and  reduced through cash flow  diversion, have
port Budget under the  research  project  transparency  and  apply the  findings in  responded by collecting revenues in kind.
"Pollution Control  in China: The Role and  learning and operational programs. (For  To disentangle  these vicious circles of
Impact  of  Inspection  and  Complaints"  details,  visit  www.worldbank.org/wbi/  control, Desai  and  Goldberg propose a
(RPO 682-44). Copies of this  paper  are  gac.)  Copies  of the paper are available free  pilot for transforming  ownership in in-
available free from the World Bank, 1818  from the World  Bank, 1818  H Street, NW,  sider-dominated firms through a system
H Street,  NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact  of simultaneous  tax-debt-for-equity con-
Please  contact  Yasmin  D'Souza,  room  Diane  Bouvet,  room J3-273,  telephone  version  and  resale  through  competitive
MC2-622, telephone  202-473-1449, fax  202-473-5818, fax  202-334-8350, email  auctions.
202-522-3230, email  address  ydsouza  address  dbouvet@worldbank.org. Policy  The objective: to show regional govern-
@worldbank.org. Policy Research Work-  Research Working Papers are also posted  ments, by example, that  a more sustain-
ing Papers are also posted on the Web at  on the  Web at  www.worldbank.org/re-  able way to protect employment is to give
w w w .w o r I d b a n k .o r g / r e s e a r c h /  search/workingpapers.  The authors  may  managers  incentives  to increase  enter-
workingpapers. The authors may be con-  be contacted at gmehrez@worldbank.org  prises' value by transferring effective  con-
tacted  at  sdasgupta@worldbank.org,  or dkaufinann@worldbank.org.  (33 pages)  trol to investors.
blaplante@worldbank.org,  or  hwangl  The  proposed  mechanism would provide
@worldbank.org.  (25 pages)  cash benefits to insiders who agree to sell
2287. The Vicious Circles  control to outside investors. The increased
of Control: Regional  cash  revenue  (rather  than  in-kind  or
2286. Transparency, Liberalization,  Governments  and Insiders in  money surrogates) would enable regional
and Banking Crises  Privatized Russian Enterprises  governments to finance safety nets for the
unemployed and to promote other regional
Gil  Mehrez  and Daniel  Kaufmann  Raj  M. Desai  and Itzhak Goldberg  initiatives.
(February  2000)  (February  2000)  This paper - a product of the Private
and Financial Sectors Development Unit,
Lack of transparency increases the prob-  In Russia and other transition economies  Europe and Central Asia Region  - is part
abilityofabankingcrisisfollowingfinan-  that  have  implemented  voucher  of a larger  effort in the region to addressPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  II
growth, governance, and  poverty in the  * Structural  reform is important,  and  change rates.  In  the  1980s and  1990s,
former Soviet Union. Copies of the paper  microeconomic  policies,  often overlooked,  developing countries as a group progres-
are available free from the World Bank,  should be started as soon as possible. This  sively liberalized their trade regimes, but
1818  H  Street,  NW,  Washington,  DC  means establishing property rights, hard-  some governments defend their exchange
20433. Please contact Sophia Cox, room  ening  budget  constraints,  building  a  rate in actions that  run  counter to long-
H6-033,  telephone 202-473-6633,  fax 202-  healthy  banking  system,  and  ensuring  run plans for liberalization.
522-0078,  email address scoxCaworldbank.  true domestic competition.  Without discussing the relative merits
org. Policy Research Working Papers are  * The  choice  of an exchange  rate regime,  of fixed and  flexible exchange rate  sys-
also  posted  on  the  Web  at  www.  another early controversy, is apparently  tems, Shatz and Tarr note that exchange
worldbank.org/research/workingpapers.  less important  than adherence to a strict  rate management  in many countries has
The authors  may be contacted at desair  monetary policy.  The floaters have tightly  resulted  in overvaluation of the real ex-
@gunet.georgetown.edu  or  igoldberg  managed their  exchange rates, while the  change rate.  Roughly 25 percent  of the
@worldbank.org.  (23 pages)  fixers have repeatedly devalued and have  countries  for which  data  are  available
often ended  up  floating. Some form of  have  overvalued  exchange rates,  with
monetary targeting is needed, but it mat-  black market  premiums from 10 percent
2288. Ten Years of Transformation:  ters  little which target is chosen so long  to more than  100 percent.
Macroeconomic Lessons  as it is adhered to.  After surveying the literature,  the au-
* Creating irreversibilities early on al-  thors  present  lessons  from  experience
Charles  Wyplosz  lows governments to change without se-  about  what  has  worked (or not) in re-
(February  2000)  riously affecting the transition.  The less  sponse to crises involving external shocks
stable  the  economy, the  more  politics  and external trade  deficits - and why.
Transition was nevergoing to  be easy, even  matters. A shaky economic  basis is fertile  Trying  to  defend  an  overvalued  ex-
with  the highly promising long-run out.  ground for policy reversals  that  set the  change rate with protectionist trade poli-
look.  Not only was theprocess  itselfa major  clock  back several years (Bulgaria, Roma-  cies is a  classic pattern,  but  experience
theoretical  and  policy  challenge,  but  nia, Russia).  shows such protection to significantly re-
politics and economics were bound to in-  This paper - a product of the Research  tard  the  country's  growth and  delay its
terfere. And  yet,  with  some spectacular  Advisory Staff - was presented  at the  integration into the world trading commu-
exceptions, most countries are now on the  Annual Bank Conference  on Development  nity. In fact, an overvalued exchange rate
right track.  Economics, April 28-30, 1999. Copies of  is often the root cause of protection, pre-
the  paper  are  available  free  from  the  venting  the  country  from  returning  to
After surveying the facts and distilling the  World Bank, 1818 H Street,  NW, Wash-  more  liberal  trade  policies that  allow
voluminous literature  on the transition to  ington,  DC 20433. Please contact Mani  growth  and  integration  into  the  world
market  economies, Wyplosz arrives  at  Jandu,  room  MC4-386,  telephone  community without exchange rate adjust-
several conclusions:  202-473-3103, fax 202-522-0304, email  ment.
With hindsight,  the old debate - Big  address  mjandu@worldbank.org. Policy  Most developing countries have down-
Bang versus gradualism  - was really a  Research Working Papers are also posted  ward price and wage rigidities and, with
problem of feasibility, although many of  on the  Web at  www.worldbank.org/re-  an  external  trade  deficit, require  some
the  arguments  in favor of the  Big Bang  search/workingpapers. The author may be  form ofnominal exchange rate adjustment
have now been proven right.  contacted  at  wyplosz@hei.unige.ch. (56  to restore external equilibrium.
Once more, inflation has been found to  pages)  Shatz  and  Tarr  present  cross-country
be incompatible with growth and the im-  econometric and  case study evidence -
portance  of a good microeconomic struc-  citing examples  from Argentina,  Chile,
ture  - especially an  effective banking  2289.  Exchange Rate  Ghana, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia,
system - has been confirmed.  Overvaluation and Trade  Turkey,  Uruguay,  and  Sub-Saharan  Af-
The decline of the  state  in  transition  Protection: Lessons from  rica (including the CFA zone)  - that over-
economies is both spectacular  and  puz-  Experience  valued  exchange rates  reduce economic
zling - combining features that  are both  growth.
desirable and dangerous.  Howard  J. Shatz and David  G.  Tarr  Defending  the  exchange  rate,  they
Among useful lessons learned:  (February  2000)  show,  has no medium-term benefits, since
* It has  paid to start  early and  move  falling reserves will eventually force de-
fast. The Big Bang is highly desirable but  Lessons from world experience about the  valuation. Better  to have devaluation oc-
impractical,  and gradualism  is unavoid-  consequences  of exchange rate overvalua-  cur without further  debilitating losses in
able but ought to be compressed as much  tion (the  frequent cause oftrade crises),  the  reserves and lost productivity because of
as  possible. The  countries that  bit the  consequences  of trying to defend an over-  import  controls.  After  devaluation  the
bullet early  and  hard  have done better  valued exchange  rate, and the most appro-  exchange rate  will reach a new equilib-
over the past decade.  priate policies for resolving an overvalua-  rium, strongly influenced by government
* Stabilize first; grow next. Macroeco-  tion.  and central bank policies.
nomic stabilization  is a prerequisite  for  This paper  - a product of Trade, De-
growth. The budget  deficit need not be  Despite a trend toward more flexible ex-  velopment Research Group - is part of a
eliminated, but the link between deficits  change rates,  more than half the world's  larger  effort in the  group to assess  the
and money growth must be severed.  countries maintain  fixed or managed ex-  consequences  of trade  liberalization  in12  Policy Research Working Paper Series
developing countries. Copies of the paper  search Group - is part of a larger  effort  and penalties traditionally imposed  by the
are available free from the  World Bank,  in the group to study the determinants  of  courts  and the  Ministry  of the Environ-
1818 H  Street,  NW, Washington,  DC  corruption. Copies of the paper are avail-  ment.
20433. Please contact Lili Tabada, room  able free from the World Bank,  1818 H  But their results also demonstrate that
MC3-333, telephone  202-473-6896, fax  Street,  NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.  adopting  stricter  standards  and  higher
202-522-1159,  email  address  Itabada  Please contact Emily Khine, room MC3-  penalties also significantly affected emis-
@worldbank.org. Policy Research Work-  341,  telephone 202-473-7471,  fax 202-522-  sion levels.
ing Papers are also posted on the Web at  3518, email address kkhine@worldbank.  Policymakers, take note:
w w w .w o r I d b a n k. o r g/ r e s e a r c h /  org. Policy  Research Working Papers are  * The presence  of strong, clear  stan-
workingpapers. David Tarr  may be con-  also  posted  on  the  Web  at  www.  dards together with a significant, credible
tacted at dtarr@worldbank.org.  (27 pages)  worldbank.org/research  workingpapers.  penalty system sends appropriate signals
The authors  may be contacted  at  rf250  to the  regulated  community, which re-
@columbia.edu  or rgatti@worldbank.org.  sponds by lowering pollution emissions.
2290.  Decentralization  (18 pages)  * The public disclosure of environmen-
and  Corruption:  Evidence  tal performance creates strong additional
across  Countries  incentives to control pollution.
2291.  Incentives  for Pollution  This paper - a product of Infrastruc-
Raymond  Fisman and Roberta  Gatti  Control:  Regulation  and  ture and Environment, Development Re-
(February  2000)  Public  Disclosure  search Group - is part of a larger effort
in the group to understand  the determi-
Empirical  estimates  suggest that fiscal  Jer6me  Foulon,  Paul Lanoie,  nants ofenvironmental performance. Cop-
decentralization in government spending  and Benoit  Laplante  ies ofthe paper are available free from the
is associated with lower government cor-  (February  2000)  World Bank, 1818 H Street, NW, Wash-
ruption.  ington, DC 20433. Please contact Yasmin
Both regulation and public disclosure be-  D'Souza,  room  MC2-635,  telephone
The relationship  between  decentraliza-  long in the environmental regulators'ar-  202-473-1449, fax  202-522-3230, email
tion of government activities and the ex-  senal. Strong, clear standards  combined  address  ydsouza@worldbank.org. Policy
tent of rent extraction by private parties  with a significant, credible  penalty system  Research Working Papers are also posted
is an important element in the recent de-  send the right signals to  the regulated com-  on the  Web at  www.worldbank.org/re-
bate on institutional design. The theoreti-  munity, which responds by lowering pol-  search/workingpapers.  Benoit Laplante
cal literature  makes ambiguous predic-  lution emissions. The public disclosure of  may  be  contacted  at  blaplante
tions about this relationship,  and  it has  environmental performance also provides  @worldbank.org. (31 pages)
remained  virtually  unexamined  by em-  strong  additional  incentives  to  control
piricists.  pollution.
Fisman and Gatti make a first attempt  2292.  Dividing  the Spoils:
at  examining  the  issue  empirically,  by  An increasing number of regulators  have  Pensions,  Privatization,  and
looking at the cross-country relationship  adopted  public disclosure  programs  to  Reform  in Russia's  Transition
between fiscal decentralization  and cor-  create  incentives  for pollution  control.
ruption as measured by a number of dif-  Previous empirical analyses of monitoring  Ethan B. Kapstein  and Branko  Milanovic
ferent indices.  and  enforcement  issues  have  focused  (March  2000)
Their estimates  suggest that fiscal de-  strictly on the impact of such traditional
centralization  in government spending is  practices as monitoring (inspections) and  The  gains from the transition inpost-com-
significantly  associated with lower corrup-  enforcement (fines and penalties) on pol-  munist Russia were captured by the new
tion.  luters'environmental  performance. Other  managerial class, which won rents from
Moreover,  they find that the origin of a  analyses have separately  focused on the  the state in the form  of privatized  enter-
country's legal system -for  example, civil  impact of public disclosure programs.  prises, state subsidies, credits, and oppor-
versus common legal  code - performs  But can these programs create incen-  tunities  for tax  evasion. Those rents re-
extremely well as an instrument  for de-  tives in addition to the normal incentives  duced state revenues that could have sup-
centralization. The estimated relationship  of fines and penalties?  ported social policy - including pension
between decentralization, when so  instru-  Foulon, Lanoie, and Laplante study the  reform, which in turn could have fueled
mented, and corruption is even stronger.  impact  of both traditional  enforcement  industrial restructuring. With neitherpen-
The evidence suggests a number of in-  and information strategies in the context  sion reform nor industrial  restructuring,
teresting areas for future work, including  of a single program, to gain insights into  Russia's economy  has continued to shrink.
investigating whether  there  are  specific  the  relative  impact  of traditional  (fines
services for  which decentralized provision  and penalties) and emerging (public dis-  Kapstein and Milanovic present  a politi-
has a particularly strong impact on politi-  closure) enforcement strategies.  cal economy model in which policy is the
cal rent extraction, and understanding the  Their results  suggest  that  the  public  outcome of an interaction between three
channels through which decentralization  disclosure strategy  adopted by the prov-  actors:  government  (G), managers  and
succeeds in keeping corruption in check.  ince of British Columbia, Canada,  has a  workers (W), and transfer recipients (P).
This paper - a  product of Macroeco-  greater impact on both emission  levels and  The government's objective  is to stay in
nomics and  Growth,  Development  Re-  compliance status  than  do orders, fines,  power, for which it needs the  support ofPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  13
either P or W. It can choose slow privati-  edu and bmilanovic@worldbank.org.  (29  appreciations have been among the main
zation with little asset stripping and sig-  pages)  reasons for runs  on currency; macroeco-
nificant taxation, thus protecting  the fiscal  nomic policy  needs to be aimed at manag-
base out of which it pays pensioners rela-  ing these. With a fixed exchange rate re-
tively well (as in Poland). Or it can give  2293. Should Capital Flows  gime, flexibility must be maintained else-
away assets and tax exemptions to manag-  Be Regulated? A Look at the  where in the economy.  Policymakers may
ers and workers, who then bankroll it and  Issues and Policies  need to make tradeoffs between price and
deliver the vote, but it thereby loses taxes  output stability once  marketjitters have set
and pays little to pensioners (as  in Russia).  Roumeen  Islam  in. There is no single right answer to the
The authors apply this model to Russia  (March  2000)  question of which to emphasize more at a
for the  period  1992-96.  An  empirical  given time; it depends on a country's cir-
analysis of electoral behavior in the 1996  What policies can emerging markets use  cumstances.
presidential election shows that the like-  to improve risk management in open, lib-  Risk  management  in  the  financial
lihood of someone voting for Yeltsin did  eralized markets?  sector
not depend on that person's socioeconomic  The health of the financial sector is re-
group per se.  Islam argues that  externalities  in finan-  lated to the government's fiscal position,
Those who tended  to vote for Yeltsin  cial markets, implicit and explicit guaran-  its macroeconomic policies, and financial
were richer, younger, and better educated  tees on financial transactions,  and infor-  crises.  The regulatory  and  supervisory
and had  more favorable expectations  of  mation asymmetries in financial markets  frameworks in developing countries need
the future. Entrepreneurs,  who had more  that may exacerbate contagion provide a  to be adapted  to the  special features  of
of  these characteristics, tended to vote for  rationale  for a government role in man-  these markets. Many developingcountries
Yeltsin as a result, while pensioners, who  aging the risk associated with cross-bor-  are subject to frequent trade  and capital
had almost none, tended to vote against  der  capital  flows.  Governments  can  account shocks while lacking the means
Yeltsin.  complement private sector risk manage-  to deal  with these  shocks, such  as  ad-
Unlike Poland, Russia failed to create  mentwith measures that help deal with the  equate insurance markets. This situation
pluralist politics in the early years of the  volatility of capital flows.  These measures  may call for policies that  not only affect
transition,  so no effective counterbalance  include those  that  control the  type  and  the  incentives  of lenders  but  also  help
emerged to offset managerial  rent-seek-  volume of capital flows  and those that help  manage risk more directly. Examples  of
ing and the state  was easily captured  by  investors make better investment decisions  such policies include maturity  and liquid-
well-organized industrial  interests.  The  and  that  may reduce herding behavior,  ity requirements.
political elite were reelected because in-  such as better information provision.  Information and transparency
dustrial  interests  bankrolled their  cam-  The main instruments  that  have been  More disclosure of information and im-
paign in return for promises that govern-  tried or recommended since the onset of  provements in the quality of that informa-
ment largesse would continue to flow.  the recent financial crises can be grouped  tion could reduce the volatility that arises
Russia  shows  vividly  how  political  in several categories.  from herding behavior. Ex ante, they may
economy  affects policymaking,  because of  Debt management  also have a beneficial effect on the alloca-
how openly and  flagrantly  government  The composition, maturity  structure,  tion of capital.
granted favors in return for electoral sup-  and level of external debt have played an  This paper - a product of the Office  of
port. But special interests, venal bureau-  important  role in financial crises.  High  the Senior  Vice  President and Chief Econo-
crats, and the exchange of favors tend to  short-term  debt relative to liquid assets  mist, Development Economics  - is part of
be the rule, not the exception, elsewhere  has been found to be consistently corre-  a larger effort in the Bank to disseminate
as well.  lated with financial crises in recent times.  knowledge. Copies of the paper are avail-
This paper - a product of Poverty and  Governments can affect the level of debt  able free from the World Bank, 1818 H
Human  Resources,  Development  Re-  (including private debt) and its composi-  Street NW, Washington, DC  20433.  Please
search Group - is part of a larger  effort  tion, though the mix of policies they use  contact Roumeen Islam, room MC4-327,
in the group to study the political economy  will vary. Prudential regulation in the fi-  telephone 202-473-2628,  fax 202-522-1158,
of reform  in  transition  countries.  This  nancial  sector,  corporate  sector regula-  email  address  rislamaworldbank.org.
study was funded by the Bank's Research  tion,  and  restrictions  on capital  move-  Policy Research Working Papers are also
Support  Budget  under  the  research  ments have all been used  with varying  posted on the Web at www.worldbank.org/
project "The Political Economy of Fiscal  success to change the level and composi-  research/workingpapers. (35 pages)
Policy in  Transition  Countries"  (RPO  tion of external debt.
682-52). Copies of the paper are available  Other macroeconomic  policies
free from the World Bank, 1818  H Street,  Most  countries that have suffered mac-  2294. Reforming the Urban Water
NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please con-  roeconomic  crises have had fixed  exchange  System in Santiago, Chile
tact Patricia Sader, room MC3-556, tele-  rate systems; some have not. But whether
phone  202-473-3902, fax 202-522-1153,  or not a country has a fixed  exchange rate  Mary  M. Shirley,  L. Colin  Xu,
email  address  psader@worldbank.org.  is not the relevant question. The question  and Ana  Maria  Zuluaga
Policy  Research Working Papers are also  is instead  whether  there is reason to ex-  (March  2000)
posted on the Web at www.worldbank.org/  pect a significant weakening  of the  cur-
research/workingpapers.  The  authors  rency, possibly as a result  of a change in  Why did reform in Santiago improve wa-
may be contacted at ekapstein@hhh.umn.  policy stance.  Large real  exchange rate  ter system performance, when similar re-14  Policy Research Working Paper Series
form attempts  under public  management  was funded  by the  Bank's  Research  Sup-  and more  general  concepts  and concerns.
in other countries  failed?  port  Budget  under  the  research  project  He  emphasizes  the  potential  tradeoffs
"Competition  and Privatization  in Urban  between  reducing  contagion  risk,  limiting
In the late  1980s,  Chile planned  to priva-  Water Supply" (RPO 682-64). Copies of the  moral hazard,  and  avoiding  unnecessary
tize Santiago's  sanitary  works  enterprise  paper  are  available  free from  the  World  destruction  of asset  value;  the  implica-
(EMOS)  but  instead  reformed  it  under  Bank,  1818 H Street NW, Washington,  DC  tions  of priority-of-claims  rules  and least-
public ownership.  It did so through  a regu-  20433.  Please  contact  Paulina  Sintim-  cost criteria;  the pros and cons of alterna-
latory  framework  that  mimicked  the  de-  Aboagye,  room  MC3-422,  telephone  202-  tive  organizational  and  institutional  ar-
sign of a concession  with a private  utility,  473-8526,  fax  202-522-1155,  email  ad-  rangements;  and  the need  for legal  secu-
setting  tariffs  that  ensured  at  least  a  7  dress  psintimaboagye@worldbank.org.  rity.  Finally,  he outlines  two prototypical
percent  return  on assets,  creating  a neu-  Policy Research  Working  Papers  are also  approaches  to striking  a balance  between
tral  regulator  independent  of  ministry  posted  on the Web at www.worldbank.org/  rules  and discretion,  an issue  underlying
intervention,  and  giving EMOS the  right  research/workingpapers.  Mary  Shirley  much  of the ongoing  policy  discussion  on
to appeal  the  regulator's  tariff  decisions.  may  be  contacted  at  mshirley  alternative  bank  exit frameworks.
This reform  of Santiago's  water  system  @worldbank.org.  (71 pages)  This paper  - a product  of the  Finance
is often cited as a case ofsuccessful  reform  Cluster,  Latin America and the Caribbean
under  public  management.  Comparing  a  Region  - is part  of a larger  effort  in the
comprehensive  measure  ofwelfare  with a  2295.  Resolving  Bank  Failures  region to document  best  practices  in bank
counterfactual  example,  Shirley,  Xu, and  in Argentina:  Recent  exit  frameworks.  Copies  of the  paper  are
Zuluaga  show  surprisingly  large  gains  Developments  and  Issues  available  free from the World Bank,  1818
from  Santiago's  reform,  given  the  rela-  H  Street  NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.
tively  good initial  conditions.  (The gains  Augusto  de la Torre  Please contact  Marga  0.  De Loayza, room
accrued  largely  to  government  and  em-  (March  2000)  15-112, telephone  202-473-8902,  fax 202-
ployees,  but  consumers  benefited  from  522-2106,  email  address  mdeloayza
improved  service  and  coverage.)  When  the international  financial  commu-  @worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  Work-
Why  did  reform  in  Santiago  improve  nity  finally  develops  core principles  and  ing  Papers  are  also posted  on the Web at
water  system  performance,  when  similar  minimum  standards  for  resolving  bank  w w w.  world  bank.  org  / research  /
reform  attempts  under  public  manage-  failures,  Argentina's  experience  should  workingpapers.  The author  may  be  con-
ment  in other  countries  failed?  serve as an important  reference in identi-  tacted  at  adelatorre@worldbank.org.  (31
i Chile  has  a long tradition  of private  fying  best practices.  pages)
water  rights,  shaped  by early recognition
that  water  is a scarce  and tradable  private  Policies  and  procedures  to resolve  bank
good.  failures have evolved significantly in Ar-  2296. An Ecological and Historical
* The  reformed  regulatory  framework  gentina  since the introduction  of currency  Perspective  on Agricultural
was designed  to attract  private  investors  convertibility  in 1991 and  particularly  in  Development  in  Southeast  Asia
to the water  system  and to motivate  them  reaction  to the 1995 "tequila"  crisis, which
to operate  efficiently  and expand  the sys-  exposed  the  inadequacy  of the  bank  exit  Yujiro Hayami
tem.  framework  in place then.  De la Torre  re-  (March 2000)
* Chile's  unique  electoral  institutions  views  the  institutional  changes  intro-
sustained  this  framework  under  state  duced in Argentina  in 1995 to handle  bank  How  location,  natural  resources,  and  dif-
operation  after  democracy  was  restored.  failures  more  effectively,  particularly  the  ferent  policies  toward  the elite's  preemp-
* Chile's strong  bureaucratic  norms  and  creation  of the deposit  guarantee  scheme  tion of unused  land  shaped  the historical
institutions  (permitting  little  corruption),  and the procedural  framework  for resolv-  development  of different  agrarian  struc-
combined  with  Santiago's  relatively  low-  ing bank  failures,  embedded  in Article 35  tures across Southeast  Asia,  conditioning
cost water  system,  permitted  prices  that  of the  Financial  Institutions  Law.  agricultural  growth  performance  until
effectively  increased  quasi-rents  for  in-  This  framework  enables  the  Central  today.
vesting  in the  system  while  minimizing  Bank  to carve  out  the  assets  and  "privi-
the risk  of inefficiency  or monopoly  rents.  leged"  liabilities  of the  failing  bank  and  According  to  Myint's  "vent-for-surplus"
The authors  also  address  the  question  transfer  them  to  sound  banks,  thereby  theory,  development  of the  economies  of
of why EMOS was reformed  but not priva-  sending  only a "residual"  balance  sheet  to  Indonesia,  the  Philippines,  and Thailand
tized,  and  what  the  costs of not  privatiz-  judicial  liquidation.  Subsequent  refine-  from the nineteenth  century  on took natu-
ing  were.  The  system  was  privatized  in  ments  in the application  of Article  35 pro-  ral  advantage  of large  tracts  of unused
1999, but  the changes  from privatization  cedures  eventually  led to current  Argen-  "empty  land" with low population  density
are likely  to be less significant  than  those  tine  practice.  The  author  examines  this  and  abundant  natural  resources  of  the
introduced  in  1989-90.  practice  in detail  by considering  the  han-  type typically  found in Southeast  Asia and
This  paper  - a product  of Regulation  dling  of  the  recent  failure  of  Banco  Africa at  the outset  of Western  coloniza-
and  Competition  Policy,  Development  Almafuerte.  tion.  When  these  economies  were  inte-
Research  Group  - is part  of a larger  ef-  The author  assesses  a number  of issues  grated  into international  trade,  hitherto
fort  in  the  group  to  draw  lessons  from  that  arise  from  the  Argentine  model  of  unused  natural  resources  (primary  com-
regulatory  reform  and understand  politi-  bank  failure  resolution,  taking  into  ac-  modities  the  indigenous  people  had  not
cal and  institutional  change.  This  study  count both country-specific  circumstances  valued)  became  the  source  of economicPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  15
development, commanding market value  202-473-3716, fax  202-522-1151, email  be higher for minorities, though not high
because of high import demand in West-  address  pkokila@worldbank.org. Policy  enough to overcome the  large consump-
ern economies.  Research Working Papers are also posted  tion difference with the majority.
The major delta of Chao Phraya  River  on the  Web at  www.worldbank.org/re-  The majority ethnic  group's model of
was the resource base of vent-for-surplus  search/workingpapers. The author may be  income generation is a poor guide on how
development with rice in Thailand; tropi-  contacted at hayami@sipeb.aoyama.ac.jp.  to fight poverty among ethnic  minority
cal rain forests filled that role in Indone-  (38 pages)  groups. Nor is it enough to target  poor
sia and the Philippines with respect to the  areas to redress ethnic inequality. Policies
production  of tropical  cash  crops. This  must be designed to reach minority house-
basic difference underlay  differences in  2297.  Sources  of Ethnic  Inequality  holds in poor areas and to explicitly rec-
distribution  of farm  size: the  unimodal  in Vietnam  ognize behavior patterns  (including com-
distribution  of peasants  or family farms  pensating behavior) that  have served the
in Thailand and the coexistence of peas-  Dominique  van de Walle  and  minorities well in the short term but in-
ants and large estate farms or plantations  Dileni  Gunewardena  tensify ethnic  inequalities  in the longer
specializing in tropical  export  crops in  (March  2000)  term. It will be important  to open up op-
Indonesia and the Philippines.  tions for minority  groups both by ensur-
Differences in  agrarian  development  To redress ethnic inequality in Vietnam,  ing that  they  are not disadvantaged  (in
were also shaped by different policies to-  it is not enough to target  poor areas. Poli-  labor markets, for example),  and by chang-
ward  the  elite's  preemption  of unused  cies must  be designed to reach minority  ing the conditions that have caused their
land. Under Spanish colonialism,  the elite  households in poor areas, to open up op-  isolation and social exclusion.
preempted unused land in the Philippines  tions by ensuring that minority groups are  This paper - a product of Public Eco-
wholesale, bifurcating  land distribution  not disadvantaged  (in labor markets, for  nomics and Rural Development, Develop-
between  noncultivating  landlords  and  example), to change the conditions  that  ment Research Group-is  part of a larger
sharecroppers in lowland rice areas, and  have caused their isolation and social ex-  effort in the group to understand  the de-
between plantation  owners and wage la-  clusion, and to explicitly recognize behav-  terminants  of poverty and the policy im-
borers in upland areas. In Indonesia, the  ior patterns (including compensating be-  plications. Copies of the paper are avail-
Dutch  government  granted  long-term  havior) that  have served the minorities  able free from the  World Bank,  1818 H
leases for uncultivated public land to for-  well but intensify ethnic inequalities in the  Street  NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.
eign planters, but prevented alienation of  longer term.  Please  contact  Hedy  Sladovich,  room
cultivated  land from native peasants,  to  MC2-609, telephone  202-473-7698, fax
avoid social instability.  Vietnam's ethnic minorities, who tend to  202-522-1154, email address  hsladovich
In Thailand, concessions were granted  live mostly in remote rural areas, typically  @worldbank.org. Policy Research Work-
for private  canal building, but the inde-  have lower living standards than the eth-  ing Papers are also posted on the Web at
pendent kingdom preserved the tradition  nic majority. How much is this because of  w w w .w o r l d b a n k. o r gl r e s e a r c h /
of giving land to anyone who could open  differences  in  economic characteristics  workingpapers. Dominique van de Walle
and cultivate it. Relatively homogeneous  (such as education levels and land) rather  may  be  contacted  at  dvandewalle
landowning  peasants  dominated  than  low returns  to  characteristics?  Is  @worldbank.org. (31 pages)
Thailand's  rural sector.  there a self-reinforcing culture of poverty
As frontiers for new cultivation closed,  in the minority groups, reflecting patterns
the plantation system's initial advantage  of past discrimination?  2298.  Fiscal  Deficits,  Monetary
(large-scale development of land and in-  Van de Walle and  Gunewardena  find  Reform,  and  Inflation
frastructure)  began to be outweighed by  that differences in levels of living are due  Stabilization  in Romania
its need to monitor hired labor. The peas-  in part to the fact that the minorities live
ant system, based on family labor need-  in less productive areas characterized by  Nina Budina  and Sweder  van Wijnbergen
ing no  supervision,  allowed Thailand's  difficult terrain, poor infrastructure,  less  (March  2000)
share of the world market in tropical cash  access to off-farm work and  the market
crops to grow, as Indonesia and the Phil-  economy,  and inferior access  to education.  Fiscalproblems are a key factor behind the
ippines lost their traditional comparative  Geographic  disparities  tend  to  persist  inflation  that  has persisted  in  Eastern
advantage. Moreover, land reform in the  because of immobility and regional differ-  Europe since 1989.  Deficits need to be cut
Philippines made land markets inactive,  ences in living standards.  But the authors  back, but by how much for a given infla-
with resulting distortions in resource al-  also  find  large  differences  within  geo-  tion target?A simple  framework links debt,
location and serious underinvestment  in  graphical areas even after controlling for  the deficit, and inflation to assess the fis-
agriculture.  household characteristics. They find dif-  cal stance of the Romanian  economy.
This paper-  a product of Rural Devel-  ferences in returns  to productive charac-
opment, Development Research Group - teristics to be the most important  expla-  Unsustainable  fiscal  deficits  were  the
is part  of a  larger effort in the  group to  nation for ethnic inequality.  chief reason for the inflation that has per-
review rural development in Asian coun-  But the minorities do not obtain lower  sisted in Eastern Europe since 1989.  Defi-
tries. Copies  ofthe paper are available free  returns  to  all characteristics.  There  is  cits need to be cut back, but by how much
from the World Bank, 1818  H Street NW,  evidence of compensating behavior.  For  for a given inflation target?
Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact  example, pure returns to location - even  Budina and van Wijnbergen develop a
Pauline Kokila,  room MC3-510,  telephone  in remote, inhospitable  areas  - tend to  simple framework for  debt, the deficit, and16  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
inflation to  study the interactions between  that own few of the standard consumer
fiscal and monetary policy in Romania's  durables -possibly  because, with no re-
economy.  This framework can be used to  tail  credit or mortgage markets,  house-
1) determine the financeable deficit and  holds must save to purchase houses and
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